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The following, an attempt to critically assess the 
historiography of the twentieth century and the 
early twenty-first century, are admittedly per-
sonal reflections open to discussion and chal-
lenge, with a focus on what I consider the short-
comings of historiography today.
I do not primarily wish to offer a survey of his-
toriography over the past century, but rather a 
perspective which is both critical and as far as 
possible global. I proceed from the assumption 
that historiography as we know it is a product 
of the last two centuries with its roots in spe-
cifically western thought. Of course, as we are 
increasingly realising, all cultures possessed a 
historical consciousness and many possessed 
also historical writing; yet what distinguishes 
history as it developed in the last two centu-
ries from all earlier forms of historiography is 
the professionalisation of historical studies. To 
be sure, China had a historical profession go-
ing back many centuries, but in a political and 
intellectual setting very different from the aca-
demic discipline which developed in the west in 
the early nineteenth century. The latter despite 
its western origins ultimately became the norm 
worldwide. 
I see three major directions in which profession-
al historical studies went since their beginnings 
in the nineteenth century. I shall identify them as 
the Rankean, the social history and the cultural-
ist models. I shall further identify a subdivision of 
social history, namely social science history. I do 
not consider them to be paradigms in the sense 
in which Thomas Kuhn uses the term in his The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions for which he 
presupposes a broad consensus among sci-
entists which simply does not exist among 
historians. Although each of the three models 
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dominated a great deal of historical theory and writing in a given epoch, there have always been 
historians who have gone in very different directions, and there has been a good deal of overlap.
The Rankean Model
To understand where historical studies stand today, we must go back to the transformation of his-
tory into an academic discipline in the nineteenth century. We can date the origins of this discipline 
with the founding of the University of Berlin in 1810 as a modern research university. With Leop-
old von Ranke, who joined the University of Berlin in 1825, no history was to be written henceforth 
which did not rely on the critical examination of primary sources. It was no longer the common 
educated person who could write history, but it took the professionally trained historian to do so. 
A whole culture of professional historical studies developed which, in many ways, still shapes his-
tory today and, as I shall argue, remains responsible for serious limitations of historiography. The 
Rankean model of professional scholarship was adopted in much of Europe, the United States, and 
very early in Meiji Japan, somewhat later in China, India, Latin America and, with decolonisation, in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In a sense, it was part of a process of modernisation which imposed itself on 
the rest of the world in an age of western imperialism and expansion. 
In fact, what took place has to be understood in its political and social context. The political setting 
in which professionalisation along the Rankean model occurred is well known; the social and par-
ticularly the economic one much less. The background was, of course, the French Revolution and 
the Napoleonic wars. The Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napoleon undid many of the re-
forms of the Napoleonic era. The absolute power of the Hohenzollern monarchy remained intact, 
in conjunction with a professional bureaucracy, which consisted largely of academically educated 
civil servants. But the social and economic reforms enacted by Prussia in 1806, which did away with 
major remnants of the feudal system, remained intact. Thus, a compromise emerged in Prussia, 
which was similar in other European states, between an old political and a modern social order, the 
latter involving the Bürgertum, elements of the middle classes. Afraid of the rising lower classes, 
the German middle classes largely supported a monarchy that only slowly made concessions to 
a very limited constitutional government. All of this directly affected history, which focused on the 
state. Thus, historical studies, as carried out by historians who were part of a professional bureau-
cracy, defended not only the interests of the state, but also those of the Bürgertum. 
The replacement of the Rankean by social history and social science models
Under the very different conditions of industrialisation, urbanisation and the formation of mass 
societies, the Rankean model appeared increasingly outdated by the turn to the twentieth centu-
ry. Simultaneous in most European countries, in the US, and Japan, and somewhat belatedly in 
Latin America and China, historians turned away from a narrow, event-oriented political history to 
one which analysed social structures and processes of change. We can name important histori-
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ans and theorists of history such as Henri Berr and Lucien Febvre in France, Henri Pirenne in Bel-
gium, Karl Lamprecht in Germany, Charles Beard in the US, Vaseli Kliuchevski and Pavel Milkiu-
kov in Russia, and the husband and wife teams Beatrice and Sidney Webb, and John and Barbara 
Hammond in England. They all pursued an interdisciplinary approach that placed political struc-
tures and processes in a broader social and economic context. Much later, some historians in the 
post-Second World War period turned to the new computer technology to introduce quantification 
into historical studies, not only in the US in economic history, but also in France, to study changing 
mentalities, and in Britain to examine demographic developments. The French historian Emma-
nuel Le Roy Ladurie as late as 1973 stated that “history that is not quantifiable cannot claim to be 
scientific”,1 a position from which, as we shall see, he soon retreated. The British historian Geof-
frey Barraclough, in a survey for UNESCO on recent trends in history, wrote: “The search for quan-
tity is beyond all doubt the most powerful of the new trends in history, the factor above all others 
which distinguishes historical attitudes in the 1970s from historical attitudes in the 1930s.” 2 An ex-
treme example for this was Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman’s computer-based study in 1974 
in which, on the basis of empirical, statistical evidence, they claimed to arrive at irrefutable answers 
on the controversial questions of the conditions of life of the slaves in the American South.3 For the 
most part, with some notable exceptions, this new social science, unlike the more reform-minded 
older social history, fitted in well into the highly dynamic technological established capitalist order. 
Basic assumptions of history as an academic discipline
Despite the fundamental differences in historical and social outlook between the Rankean, the so-
cial history and the social science history models, they shared certain basic assumptions which 
deeply affected the ways in which their practitioners wrote history. These basic assumptions were 
emphatically challenged in the last third of the twentieth century. The first of these assumptions 
involved the belief in the scientific character of historical studies, and the second the belief in the 
coherence of history. Both convictions held sway well into the second third of the twentieth century, 
when they were challenged by what we have described as the culturalist model.
We must, however, keep in mind that the German term “science” (Wissenschaft) has a different 
meaning than the English term “science”, which refers more closely to the natural sciences and 
their methodologies. In English, history is more commonly viewed as a form of scholarship, rath-
er than as a science. In all continental European as well as East Asian languages, the meaning of 
the term “science” is closer to its German than to its English meaning. In German, Wissenschaft 
refers to methodologically strict forms of inquiry which demand professional training. Science and 
professionalism are thus intertwined.
Unlike the natural sciences, the humanities such as history are not dealing with establishing ab-
stractions, which may lend themselves to quantitative formulations, but seek to comprehend (ver-
stehen) the meaning and intentions of human beings, individually and collectively, which cannot 
be formulated abstractly but have to take into account their individual character. Thus, all areas of 
human activity are capable of being studied “scientifically”; or better said “in a scholarly manner”. 
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There is thus a science of literature, Literaturwissenschaft, a science of art (Kunstwissenschaft), a 
science of religion, Religionswissenschaft, etc. While in the first half of the twentieth century social 
science-oriented historians distanced themselves from this loose definition of a humanistic sci-
ence, they did so because they wanted an even stricter conception of science, closer to the meth-
odologies of the natural sciences.
The second basic conviction held by the bulk of nineteenth-century Rankeans and twentieth-centu-
ry social and social science historians consisted in the belief in the coherence of history. The older 
idea that historians recount “histories” was replaced by the idea that history had a direction, that one 
could discern what is historically significant and what is not. For many this spelled out progress in 
the direction of the norms of western civilisation. At a later stage, the concept of progress was re-
placed by that of modernisation. Inherent in the ideas of progress and modernisation was a strong 
dose of Eurocentrism, an idea which later was widely repudiated but by no means overcome. 
Thus, a culture of professionalisation developed which was parallel in all humanitarian and scientif-
ic disciplines. To be considered scientific or scholarly, studies had to be conducted in a professional 
manner. There were similar ways in which historians and scientists were trained, the ways aca-
demic degrees counted in recruitment and promotion. Scientific and scholarly organisations were 
founded, first primarily on a national, later an international level, together with peer-reviewed jour-
nals. The way history was conducted henceforth and still is, thus, differed from the way in which 
it had been conducted before, since classical antiquity. In the west historians from Thucydides to 
Edward Gibbon were not bound to a university or an academic institution, Their writings combined 
literature with scholarship. Now, beginning with the Rankean model a clear distinction was drawn 
between history and literature. Yet this distinction has been overstressed in later assessments of 
nineteenth-century historiography. Ranke launched the critical evidential approach to history with 
the often-cited comment that he “wants merely to show what actually happened” (wie es eigentlich 
gewesen). But he also shortly thereafter wrote: “History is distinguished from all other sciences in 
that it is also an art.” Here critical scholarship and literature merged. And Ranke, as did many who 
followed him, did not write primarily for specialists, but for a broad public, who read him and viewed 
his writings as great literature. It is not surprising that Theodor Mommsen, who in his narratives 
on Roman history applied strict standards of source criticism, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Lit-
erature in 1902, the second time that it was given. A great deal of history was written outside aca-
demia, not only in the forms of novels but also of historical narratives. The sharp division between 
academic and nonacademic history is a development of the twentieth century, which still contin-
ues. To some extent it has been bridged by the important role which the film and the TV now play.
An assessment of the positive and negative sides of the professional models 
prior to the culturalist challenge
Now I will turn briefly to the positive and the negative sides of professionalisation. Of course, pro-
fessionalisation contributed a great deal to our understanding of the past by requiring a greater 
reliance on the critical examination of sources. It brought together two major orientations of the 
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eighteenth century – an evidential one, which focused on establishing the veracity and meanings 
of sources, the other a narrative one, of which Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire is a good example, which nevertheless sought to present a true story. Yet at the 
same time, a great deal was lost. A good example of what was gained and lost is provided by the 
multivolume A Universal History from the Earliest Account of Time, launched in England in 1736 by 
an Islamic scholar, George Sale, and his amateur associates as a very successful commercial en-
terprise was quickly translated into the major European languages. This was indeed a universal 
history. There were volumes not only on the history of the European nations, but also on the Amer-
icas, East and South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa where the non-European peoples, including the 
Africans, were treated not as inferior, but as humans of equal dignity. It dealt not only with politi-
cal events, but also with daily lives. The book was sharply criticised by the German Enlightenment 
historian, August Ludwig von Schlözer, who himself wrote a world history, for its poor scholar-
ship, where imagination filled in for solid evidence – which was a justified critique – followed by the 
charge that it was not really history but constituted a mere accumulation of facts.
The turn from world history to a focus on Europe and Europe’s domination of the world preced-
ed professionalisation and was well developed in the eighteenth century. However, it had become 
an integral part of professional historiography well into the twentieth century. The idea of Europe-
an superiority, often coupled with racism, was broadly accepted. At the turn from the seventeenth 
to the eighteenth centuries, the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz still spoke of two 
great civilisations at the two ends of the Eurasian continent, the Chinese and the European, and 
also regarded Arab civilisation highly. But the impact of colonialism and imperialism changed this. 
Thus David Hume in the late eighteenth century considered “Negroes to be naturally inferior to the 
Whites”. He continued: “There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion  … No ingen-
ious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.”4 This view persisted well into the twen-
tieth century. As late as 1968, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford 
University, dismissed Africa “as the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but 
irrelevant quarters of the globe”. He further wrote: “There is only the history of the Europeans in 
Africa. The rest is darkness and darkness is not a subject of history.”5
Professionalism also led to the exclusion well into the late twentieth century of women, Jews and 
ethnic minorities, not only from positions in academic institutions but also as subjects of histori-
cal study. This was directly tied to the way faculty was recruited. Women had no place at the uni-
versities until well into the twentieth century. Catherine Macaulay’s History of England, the work 
of a liberal, early feminist, who challenged Hume’s conservative interpretation of English history, 
had been well received in eighteenth-century England; she was totally ignored in the nineteenth 
century. Only in the second half of the twentieth century did women begin to play a very important 
role in North American, western European and Indian historiography. In the US, historians of the 
New History and Progressive History schools totally ignored the Black population. While the work 
of a Columbia University historian, James Randall, whose Civil War and Reconstruction (1937), ex-
plained the failure of the Reconstruction largely in terms of the racial inferiority of the Black elec-
torate, was hailed as a standard work in the 1930s, W. E. B. Du Bois’ Black Reconstruction (1935), 
which throws a very different light on this same electorate, now considered a classic, was not even 
reviewed in the American Historical Review. 
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Stage 3: The culturalist turn. Paris 1968 to Athens 2015
It was only in the 1960s that the full impact of the changes wrought by the Second World War were 
felt with decolonisation, the decline of Europe on the international scene, the Algerian and Viet-
nam Wars, the civil rights movement in the US, the emergence of feminism, and student uprisings 
throughout the world, in Paris, West Berlin, Mexico City, South Korea, Tokyo, and on campuses in 
the US. These protests centred around the social, racial and sexual inequalities in the existing soci-
eties, but they went beyond a critique of the capitalist economic order, to a much broader challenge 
of the culture on which it rested. This discontent was not limited to capitalist countries but also found 
expression in protest movements in communist-dominated Poland and in the Prague Spring, and 
somewhat later in South Korea and the People’s Republic of China, which ended tragically in the 
massacre of students in Gwangju and in Tiananmen Square. All this would have an impact on the 
reshaping of historical thought and writing, as would the fundamental changes which took place in 
the composition of the student body and in the recruitment of faculty. The number of students in-
creased dramatically, to include students who had been underrepresented such as women, or large-
ly excluded as members of ethnic and racial minorities. And at the same time these same groups for 
the first time became important subjects of history. And new areas of study were opened, the his-
tory of women not only in a political context, but aspects of women’s lives, emotions, sexuality and 
the relation of genders. The various ethnic and racial groups began to explore and reconstruct their 
past, aware of the discriminations it had involved. A shift took place from the traditional reliance on 
documentary evidence to oral sources and to the exploration of individual and collective memory. 
It is at this point that the turn took place from social science to cultural approaches to history. I 
want to make a distinction here between the cultural and the linguistic turn as approaches to the 
study of history, on the one hand, and as theoretical doctrines, on the other. As a cultural approach, 
it threw light on aspects of history which had been neglected by much of social science-oriented 
history, although at times it overlooked the political and social context of culture. As a doctrine, it 
denied the possibility of rational inquiry into the past.
The work of Lynn Hunt exemplifies well the transition from the old to the new historiography and 
beyond it. Her Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (1984) offers a good example 
what the cultural turn means at its best. While when she set out in 1976 to write the book, she had 
intended a “social history of revolutionary politics”; she now realised that the political side was only 
a part of the story, but as the title of her book indicated she by no means neglected the political side 
or the role of class, but saw them in a broader cultural context, in which symbolic gestures, images 
and rhetoric all played their part. In this way, the cultural turn constituted a clear enrichment. The 
linguistic turn heightened the awareness of how language influenced political activity. But a gulf 
arose between practicing historians and literary theorists. While serious historians recognised the 
cultural context of political and social history, some literary academicians and some philosophers 
turned to radical forms of epistemological relativism. They would agree with Jacques Derrida when 
he argued that “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (there is no external reality to which language refers),6 
that there are only texts. Michel Foucault held that the text exists independently of its authors, 
whose intentions do not enter. From the position of cultural anthropology, Clifford Geertz main-
tained that cultures represented texts, “webs of significance”, which must be confronted directly 
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as “others”, ruling out theory-guided questions.7 From the perspective of literary theory, Hayden 
White maintained that “there has been a reluctance to consider historical narratives as what they 
most manifestly are: verbal fictions”.8 Then, of course, there were historians such as Joan Scott, 
who preached the gospel according to Derrida, but conducted archival research in pursuit of seri-
ous questions of feminist concern in a very traditional manner. 
Marxism presents another good example of the transition from the old to the new culture-oriented 
historiography. But it was not the Marxism of Marx or that of Lenin, but a revision of orthodox Marx-
ism generally called western Marxism. Two quite different Marxist writings, Antonio Gramsci’s Pris-
on Notebooks, written in Mussolini’s prisons, and György Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness 
(1923), moved away from Marx’s materialist interpretation of history and stressed the role of culture. 
While Lukács still clung to Marx’s idea of a revolutionary industrial proletariat, Gramsci expanded 
Marx’s concept of class to include the masses of nonindustrial workers, men and women, in indus-
trially less-developed countries, whom he denoted as the “subaltern classes”, subordinated to the 
established order not just by political and economic power, but by “cultural hegemony”, the control 
which the dominant culture exerted over their minds. It was only in the very different atmosphere of 
the 1960s that their work became well known. It was the Gramscian revision of Marx which was to 
play an important role in the historiography of countries of the so-called third world, with the launch-
ing of Subaltern Studies in India in 1982, which in turn affected historical writings in Latin America 
and Sub-Saharan Africa. E. P. Thompson’s widely accepted redefinition of the English working class 
in cultural terms went in this direction. But Thompson was soon criticised for clinging too closely to 
Marx’s elitist concept of an essentially male industrial working class. The History Workshop in Eng-
land sought a broad history from below of the lives of working people, men and women, in capitalist 
economies. Charles van Onselen, part of the History Workshop in South Africa, wrote a history of the 
rural poor, white and black, in Witwatersrand under the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation 
including the very classes – the unemployed, the criminals, the prostitutes, in other words the very 
Lumpenproletariat – which interested neither Marx nor Thompson. 
The importance of Marxism for the new history should not be overstated, but it reflected changes 
which now took place in much of historiography generally, Marxist as well as non-Marxist. There 
was a reaction now against social science models, including Marxist ones, as they had been prac-
ticed in the past; histories of anonymous social structures and processes of change, in which the 
life experiences of concrete human beings had no place. A good example of a history without peo-
ple is Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s The Peasants of Languedoc (1966), in which he dealt with the 
history of the peasantry, relying largely on statistics, in a large region in southern France in terms of 
demographic and price cycles, in which individual human beings, except for a brief interlude about 
the carnival in Romans, had no part. Nine years later in 1975 in Montaillou, he went in a complete-
ly different direction, this time dealing with the lives of the individual members of a community of 
religious heretics in a small village in early thirteenth- century southern France, with the interrela-
tion between its inhabitants, their emotions and sexuality. their religious beliefs; using no statistical 
sources but instead the protocols of spoken testimony. 
An increasing number of historians throughout Europe and North America now turned to what the 
Italians called microstoria, centring on the lives and fates of individuals in a historical setting. In the 
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place of the master narratives which had been central to much history before, there was now a re-
turn to a multitude of narratives. This also involved a repudiation of ideas of modernisation which 
at their core proceeded from a Eurocentric perspective. The outcome of history could no longer be 
the fulfilment of western norms. There are two responses to the question of modernisation: one 
originating very early with the radical right, with thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche, and with Martin 
Heidegger, who ended up with the Nazis, but taken over by thinkers on the left, including Michel 
Foucault and including some members of the Frankfurt School, including Herbert Marcuse, who 
now held the rational outlook of the Enlightenment responsible for the catastrophes of the twen-
tieth century, a view shared by the Indian philosopher Ashis Nandy, who considered the secular 
worldview of the Enlightenment and its scientific rationality responsible for the wars, gulags and 
genocides of the twentieth century. It is striking that this view is not shared by many thinkers in 
developing countries such as India and China. Thus in China, despite the official Marxist ideology 
of the communist government, for many historians the modern west represented a goal to be ap-
proximated. And the Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty in Provincializing Europe (2000) stressed, 
on the one hand, that modernisation takes on different forms in different cultural settings, and, on 
the other hand, that there are basic elements of Enlightenment thought, including the commitment 
to human rights, without which a modern Indian nation cannot do.
Reflections on the present state of historical studies
Now to 2015. There is a tendency among some historians, like Lynn Hunt in her most recent Writ-
ing History in a Global Era (2014), to conclude that the cultural and linguistic turns belong to the past 
in an increasingly global era. I agree, but would not go quite so far. To get an admittedly superficial 
impression, I shall look at the programme of two recent annual meetings, that of the American 
Historical Association in January 2015 and that of its German counterpart in September 2014. In 
the American programme we find many sections along the lines of the cultural turn, including an 
almost obsession with topics of sexuality and homosexuality. These topics play a much more lim-
ited role in the German programme. There is a break away in both programmes from nation-ori-
ented topics: in the American programme there is a strong global and in the German programme 
a European perspective. Several sessions in the American programme are devoted to race, sex 
and slavery. Few sections in the German programme deal with German topics; the focus is now 
much more than in the American programme on the twentieth century with its horrors. It would be 
interesting to compare the present programmes with programmes 40 or 80 years ago and make 
a transcultural comparison which would also include non-western countries. 
Final remarks
We live in an increasingly global world. Only very belatedly have historical studies taken this into 
account. Eurocentrism has been widely rejected, but in fact it is still very much alive. As Dominic 
Sachsenmeier has pointed out, in a recent ten-year period 13 times as many books have been 
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translated from western languages into Chinese than the reverse. There is a considerable Chinese 
body of literature on global topics which, except for a limited number of Sinologists, has simply 
been ignored. China is still not a part of the international discourse. In the case of largely Anglo-
phone India this may be different. It was encouraging that that the International Congress of the 
Historical Sciences took place in China in 2015. 
A final word about professionalism. The reorientation of historical studies and writing in the last 
decades of the twentieth century challenged the basic assumptions of the prevailing historiogra-
phies, but generally accepted the professional character of historical studies without any major 
criticism. The gulf between professional scholarship and the public is much greater today than 
it was in the nineteenth century. And within the academic institutions, including those devoted to 
teaching undergraduates, the command is “publish or perish”, even if many of the publications re-
sulting have little relevance for teaching. This ritual needs to be reformed, but it will be very difficult 
to break through the entrenched policies of recruitment and promotion. Similarly, despite the talk 
about interdisciplinary approaches to history, only limited progress has been made. But the de-
partmental organisation of universities and colleges generally throughout the world works against 
truly interdisciplinary history. Perhaps the example of the Maison des sciences humaines replacing 
traditional departments offers an alternative.
There is no dominant model of historical studies today, and that is good. An overview of the two 
programmes I mentioned shows, a large diversity in historical approaches, but the culturalist 
model is still very much alive in the US. The limits of the three models I discussed are very clear 
now. None of them were truly comprehensive. The Rankean model, with its radically elitist view 
of history, turned out to be out of step in an emerging democratic world, and the social science 
model had little concern for the human factor and showed little interest in the cultural aspects of 
society. The culturalist model brought the cultural side back into history. It rightly pointed at the 
limitations of the older historiographies, particularly the social science models. Yet in its more 
radical forms, it not only neglected the economic and social context of culture, but its extreme 
relativism denied the very possibilities of rational inquiry needed to understand the global world 
in which we live. We badly need a social science to understand this world, but one which does not 
return to the older model, but considers the manifold aspects which make up our rapidly chang-
ing world. To end on a positive note, a lot has been gained in the last decades, with the opening of 
new topics and the exploration of new methodological approaches of which the older historiog-
raphies did not dream. Despite the shortcomings which I have pointed out, today history is much 
richer than it was ever before.
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